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R E S U M E N  Presentamos algunas propiedades límite 
de un mecanismo de asignación de recursos en redes 
conocido como la Subasta Progresiva de Segundo Precio 
(PSP). Este mecanismo busca asignar eficientemente re-
cursos de red tales como ancho de banda y capacidad de 
buffer, en un ambiente caracterizado por usuarios que 
compiten; la subasta PSP busca resolver, o al menos ali-
viar, la congestión en una red exigiendo un intercambio 
de información entre el subastador y los usuarios sin mu-
cha carga de señalización, y resolviendo el problema de 
la asignación de un recurso (teóricamente) infinitamente 
divisible. La regla de asignación está inspirada en la su-
basta de segundo precio (Vickrey). Nuestro análisis de la 
subasta PSP explora sus propiedades límite, por ejemplo, 
cómo cambia la asignación en la presencia de un conjun-
to polarizado de usuarios. Esto último se refiere a una 
situación en la que los usuarios se dividen en dos grupos: 
unos con alta demanda y baja valoración por el recurso 
y otros con baja demanda y alta valoración. Mecanismos 
tales como las subastas se han vuelto muy populares para 
la asignación de recursos en redes que presentan conges-
tión, tales como el acceso a servicios Internet.
A B S T R A C T  We present some limiting properties of 
a network resource allocation mechanism known as the 
Progressive Second Price (PSP) auction. This mechanism 
aims at efficiently allocate network resources, such as 
bandwidth or buffer capacity, in an environment cha-
racterized by competing users; the PSP auction seeks to 
solve or at least to ameliorate congestion in a network 
demanding a low signalling burden between the auctio-
neer and the users, and solving the allocation problem of 
an (theoretically) infinitely divisible resource. The alloca-
tion rule is inspired in the second price (Vickrey) auction. 
Our analysis of the PSP auction explores its limiting pro-
perties, namely, how the allocation changes in the pre-
sence of a polarized set of users. A polarized set of users 
is a mixture of users of two types: high valuation, low 
demand users and low valuation, high demand users. 
Mechanisms such as auctions are becoming increasingly 
popular to handle the resource allocation problem in net-
works facing congestion, such as the access to Internet-
based services.
Fernando Beltrán*
Key words: Network resource allocation, band-
width auction, congestion prices.
* ISOM Department Faculty of Business and Economics, 
University of Auckland.
f.beltran@auckland.ac.nz 
Palabras clave: Distribución de recursos en re-
des, subastas de ancho de banda, precios por 
congestión.
revista de ingeniería # 20 facultad de ingeniería  universidad de los andes  noviembre 2004
a  n o t e  o n  s o m e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  a n  e f f i c i e n t  n e t -
w o r k  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  m e c h a n i s m
Recibido el 30 de septiembre de 2004, aprobado el 8 de octubre de 2004.
[50]  # 20  revista de ingeniería [51]
I N T R O D U C T I O N
A key aspect in the development of the Internet ac-
cess market and, consequently, the commercial use 
of broadband IP applications is the issue of efficient 
allocation of networks resource, more specifically 
bandwidth. If the fact that many users trying to 
gain access to a – frequently- scarce resource, indu-
ces congestion in the network, then there is a need 
for a market approach to pricing of congestion in 
Internet. Negative externalities arise when resour-
ces such as bandwidth and buffer space are shared 
by users unable to coordinate their actions. There-
fore, the network administration should consider 
an efficient allocation of resources in order to share 
dispersed resources among users who are also dis-
persed. Besides, as networks incur in costs to deli-
ver their services, pricing serves a double purpose of 
cost recovering and, hopefully, efficient allocation.
This note presents a brief overview of selected 
sources of the literature on pricing network resour-
ces under congestion. The latter serves the main 
purpose of studying some limiting properties of a 
theoretical mechanism for pricing under conges-
tion: the Progressive Second Price (PSP) auction 
[Semret, 1999]. The methods in the literature see-
med to have evolved from some purely engineering-
oriented whereby central control is the key, up to 
methods that acknowledge the complex characteris-
tics of economic agents competing for resources in 
the context of access to bandwidth and that use the 
principles of a branch of economics called mecha-
nism design. The analysis of the auction explores 
some of the limiting properties of the PSP auction, 
namely, how the allocation changes in the presence 
of a polarized set of users. A polarized set of users 
is a mixture of users some of which have a high 
demand but a low willingness to pay per unit of the 
resource and others whose demand is relatively low 
with a higher per unit willingness to pay. 
1 .  E N G I N E E R I N G  A P P R O A C H  
T O  P R I C I N G
The goal of an efficient network resource pricing 
mechanism is to optimally allocate network 
resources among users while both satisfying their 
needs and controlling congestion. A formidable 
challenge to ISPs and other sellers of networks 
access is to design a price scheme that solves or at 
least ameliorates congestion, which is responsible 
for delays and degradation of a network’s overall 
performance. In the presence of network congestion, 
users would prefer to adjust their demand for 
capacity. Nevertheless, Internet has not provided 
economic but engineering tools to solve for network 
resource allocation. Users of Internet pay a flat 
rate for access, regardless of their traffic patterns 
or quality of service needs. As long as traffic grows 
and congestion becomes a sensitive issue, more and 
more users would be willing to pay differentiated 
rates for differentiated services
The technical literature introduces several pricing 
schemes, which are described below. The most 
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prevalent of the pricing schemes is the flat rate, 
by which any user will pay a fixed amount for a 
fixed bandwidth (Bailey, 1999). Congestion is dealt 
with on a “best effort” basis in accordance to the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). One of the 
most important effects of such tariff policy is the 
network externalities, which stimulate the growth 
in connections and consequently in traffic. On the 
other hand, billing costs to the provider are kept 
low. 
Clark (Clark, 1995) has proposed to distribute 
the main features of the service, such as capacity, 
among the users based not on guarantees but on 
expectations; since it would be useless to guarantee 
a given performance level during a certain time of 
the day, it would turn out to be more logical to 
think of the performance a user would expect from 
the network service. Such performance is defined 
as the largest amount of information a user would 
send constrained to a preset latency at a given 
transference rate. 
Cost-based priority-based pricing was origina-
lly proposed by McLean and Sharkey (McLean and 
Sharkey, 1994), using Aumman-Shapley prices and 
the Shapley value to find access prices as a func-
tion of the users’ transfer rates in an architecture 
model that uses a first-in first-out (FIFO) priority 
queue model. A paper extending the use of coope-
rative games shows (Beltrán and García, 2001) the 
feasibility of obtaining congestion dependent prices 
in a network, establishing simultaneously diffe-
rent quality-of-service levels among the users. This 
approach recognizes and quantifies the effects of 
congestion, efficiently allocating the cost of conges-
tion to users. 
2 .  M A R K E T  A P P R O A C H  T O  P R I C I N G
A different approach is taken by the DifffServ 
architecture model which intends to address 
the issue of providing quality of service (QoS) 
guarantees to multiple sources of traffic. The basic 
idea behind the Diffserv model is to decentralize 
QoS provision to the level of independent domains, 
each with a “bandwidth broker” (Parameswaran et 
al., 2001). Such broker makes admission decisions 
of applications based on local allocation policies 
and once the application is accepted, the broker 
marks each packet as belonging to one of a handful 
of classes. 
A new trend in pricing is the introduction of usage-
based charging schemes (Tuffin, 2001); several 
works consider the users’ willingness to pay and 
the congestion of the network; more precisely they 
propose that transfer rates be adjusted according 
to such considerations (Kelly, 1998). Another 
solution, which includes auctioning for priority, 
is the “smart market” approach (McKie-Mason 
and Varian, 1994). This approach is incentive 
compatible in that a user sets the bid price in 
each packet equal to her true valuation, implying 
the lowest possible information requirement. 
Nevertheless, the engineering costs of sorting 
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packets by bid price and other functions are very 
high, rendering the mechanism not feasible for 
implementation under current technology.
Some recent literature addresses the issue of 
auctions for bandwidth instead of dealing with 
auctions for individual packets (Lazar and Semret, 
2001), (Semret, 1999) (Semret et al., 1999) (Semret 
et al. 2000). Such works introduce the use of 
auctions for sharing network resources. 
3 .  T H E  P R O G R E S S I V E  S E C O N D  P R I C E  
( P S P )  A U C T I O N  
Semret (Semret, 1999) proposes a game theoretic 
approach to the objective of a more efficient and 
fair utilization of shared resources; such approach, 
called networking games, results in mechanisms 
where intelligence and decision making is distribu-
ted. In a network the interacting agents acquire re-
sources from the network on behalf of applications 
which need bandwidth and buffer space. Outcomes 
as efficient as those of a central controller may be 
collectively achieved if appropriate rules of interac-
tion are introduced. Semret proposes that pricing 
can be resolved within the engineering of the net-
work, overcoming the ex-post price structure gene-
rally imposed on most networks; his mechanism is 
called the Progressive Second Price (PSP) auction.
PSP is based on two aspects of mechanism design 
(Williams, 1986): realization and Nash implemen-
tation. Realization means the design of a message 
process (exchange of information between agents 
and the centre) enabling the achievement of a cer-
tain objective. Nash implementation means that 
allocation rules are designed with incentives, dri-
ving the players to equilibrium where the desired 
allocation is achieved.
An interesting, and economically attractive charac-
teristic of PSP is that “the exchanged messages are as 
small as possible, while still conveying enough informa-
tion to allow resource allocation and pricing to be per-
formed without any a-priori knowledge of demand, and 
the amount of computation at the center is minimized” 
(Semret, 1999).
The auction consists of players submitting bids (a 
player i declares his desired shared q
i
 of the total 
resource and a price p
i
 he is willing to pay for it) 
and the auctioneer allocating shares of the resource 
to the players based on their bids. The PSP auction 
allocation rule assigns player i a bandwidth which 
is equal to the minimum value between his capacity 
bid, q
i
, and the remaining capacity resulting from 
the total capacity Q minus the sum of all those 
capacity bids, q
k
, whose price bids are greater than 
or equal to i’s price bid, that is, p
k
 > p
i
. In other 
words, the allocation rule is: 
    , 
where 
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and s = (p
i
,s
-i
) represents the set of biding prices by 
i – p
i
 – and by the rest of the players – s
-i
. 
The cost to any agent i is the sum of the products of 
each price bid made by every agent j (different from 
i) times her incremental allocated capacity, that is, 
the difference between the capacity allocated to j, if 
j were not participating, and her allocated capacity 
when he participates. In other words, the pricing 
rule is:
As Semret puts it, (Semret, 1999) in a PSP auction 
what a player pays for his allocation is covering 
the opportunity cost incurred at by the exclusion 
of those bidders due to i’s bid. In a way, the 
mechanism “compensates” the auctioneer for any 
losses he might have when not allocating any 
part of the resources to those who have “lost” the 
auction to i.
4 .  A N  E X A M P L E  O F  T H E  A P P L I C A T I O N  
O F  T H E  P S P  A U C T I O N
We can illustrate how PSP works with a simple 
example, where 5 potential users contend for band-
width owned by an ISP. The ISP has a T2 channel, 
able to deliver at 6.312 Mbps. As an illustration of 
a case when no congestion charges are levied, con-
sider only 4 users as shown in Table 1. As can be 
seen, the aggregated demand, 3.472 Mbps, does not 
exceed the total capacity of the channel. Therefore 
each player gets the capacity that he requires and 
the congestion price charged is zero.
Total Bandwidth 6.312 Mbps
Reference price1 of 1 Mbps  1
Player Bandwidth (q
i
) Bid (p
i
)
1 1.544 0.323
2 0 0
3 1.544 0.394
4 0.128 0.927
5 0.256 0.854
Table 1
If the channel was to be shared by the same users 
plus a new one demanding the whole T2 capacity, 
that is, player 2 asking for 6.312 Mbps at a rather 
low price –one that is barely matching the lowest 
existing bid-, the bandwidth allocated to each pla-
yer and the charges would vary as shown in Table 2. 
Player Bandwidth
q
i
Bid
p
i
Allocation
a
i
Price
c
i
1 1.544 0.323 1.544 0.497
2 6.312 0.322 2.840 1.444
3 1.544 0.394 1.544 0.497
4 0.128 0.927 0.128 0.041
5 0.256 0.854 0.256 0.082
Table 2
The total bandwidth allocated is the total availa-
ble, and the lowest bid gets only a fraction of its 
demand. 
The example here illustrates a situation where the 
set of users is a mixture of some users with a high 
demand but a low per-unit willingness to pay for 
the resource and others whose demand is relatively 
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low with a higher per-unit willingness to pay. In 
some sense we can say that the set of users is pola-
rized. This could be interpreted as a case in which 
an access provider has two types of customers: retail 
customers and access resellers. 
Let us see what would happened if, in the process 
of seeking for more capacity, player 2 decided to 
bid higher while the other bidders’ bids remained 
the same. After all, they are getting what they want 
and player 2 is not. 
Charts 1and 2 show how the auctioneer would allo-
cate bandwidth and price to each player, had player 
2 changed her (initial) bid. This analysis is based 
on comparative statics and is not aimed at finding 
equilibriums. Semret (Semret, 1999) shows how 
players adjust their bids to get a new equilibrium 
whenever an existing equilibrium is disturbed by 
an action (a new bid) of one of the players and the 
auctioneer changes the allocation accordingly.
Our intention here is to illustrate the effects of di-
fferent bids by a player whose characteristics resem-
ble those of a reseller or access provider. The results 
show that player 2 must beat higher valuations, 
expressed in her competitor’s bids, if she wanted a 
bigger portion of the resource. Such result is not 
surprising; however, it is an interesting feature of 
the PSP auction to observe that as long as player 
2 matches subsequent higher bids, PSP punishes 
those bidders whose bids are equal2. Once player 2’s 
bid overpasses a rival bid, the latter gets excluded. 
The prices observed seem to reflect the exclusion-
principle, which states that 2 is covering the decla-
red willingness to pay of those being excluded. 
In the context presented here, it is worthwhi-
le mentioning that one possible drawback of the 
mechanism is the exclusion of high-demand users 
–resellers and access providers- in favour of low-
demand users as long as the latter’s bids are high 
enough. It is possible that such costs have an effect 
on the price quoted to the final users of the access 
provider.
5 .  T H E  D E S I G N  O F  A N  A L T E R N A T I V E  
M E C H A N I S M  
The PSP auction is a very ingenious mechanism 
inspired in the Vickrey auction with the additio-
nal feature that its computation is not expensive. 
Furthermore, it does not impose a high information 
burden on users and, therefore, it becomes a very 
attractive idea as a market-oriented mechanism that 
is incentive compatible and individually rational 
(Semret, 1999). 
At the centre of the design problem, lies the issue 
of whether a pricing mechanism can be realistica-
lly implemented given the complexities inherent 
to achieving efficiency and Nash implementation 
(Williams, 1986). PSP aims at solving the com-
plexity, brought into the mechanism design process 
by the structure of the message sent from a player 
to the auctioneer. In fact, PSP achieves the eco-
nomic objectives of incentive compatibility and 
efficiency, while demanding a small signalling load 
1 In this example price is not 
given in any actual currency; 
prices are quoted in relation to 
a representative unit price per 
Mbps.
2 Notice how, when several bids 
tie, the total bandwidth alloca-
ted is not the total bandwidth 
offered.
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and a computationally simple allocation rule (Se-
mret et al., 2000).
There is a key aspect in making a pricing mecha-
nism attractive to a network resource seller: how 
well it does away with revenues. The PSP auction 
does not seem to address such issue since it focuses 
on achieving incentive compatibility and simpli-
city in computation and signalling. In spite of its 
simplicity, the PSP auction only allows the exchan-
ge of messages that reflect how much a user values a 
given amount of bandwidth; after all, it is common 
that a user is just trying to get a much defined 
amount of bandwidth. One can wonder whether 
allowing users to express their bids as a continuous 
function of bandwidth, might improve the trade-off 
between maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue and 
achieving efficiency while keeping the message pro-
cess as simple as possible. 
One way to start is to think of the message process 
as a pair (a, b), which indicates the intersect (a) and 
the slope (b) of an affine function representing the 
user’s demand function. Thus, any user would re-
veal her willingness to pay for different amounts of 
bandwidth, letting her reflect changes in her valua-
tion (marginal valuation) for different units of the 
resource. This might reflect the fact that the user 
has a certain degree of flexibility on her demand 
for bandwidth, and is not committed to a unique 
amount.
Chart 1: Bidders´ 
allocated band-
widths change 
when player 2 de-
cides to change her 
bidding price. All 
other bids remain 
constant.
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Chart 2: Bidders´ allo-
cated prices change 
when player 2 decides 
to change her bid. 
All other bids remain 
constant. (Prices for 
players being exclu-
ded are defined by 
the auction in spite of 
not being allocated 
any bandwidth; in 
such case one can 
interpret such price 
as one that would be 
charged to a player if 
she increased her bid 
and beat her nearest 
wining rival).
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